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Between ‘going private’ and ‘NHS privatisation’: patient choice, 
competition reforms and the relationship between the NHS and 






Patient choice is a concept linked with treatment decisions,1 access to healthcare funding,2 
and the doctor-patient relationship.3 This article adopts a patient choice perspective to 
examine how the relationship between the National Health Service (NHS) and 
supplementary private healthcare sector has shaped the recent competition reforms of the 
English NHS4 in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (‘the 2012 Act’)5 and Regulations 11-
13 of the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) 
Regulations 2013 (‘the 2013 Regulations’)6 introduced by the Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition government (2010-2015). This perspective not only helps explain why 
such reforms are difficult to implement, but also demonstrates that the NHS-private 
healthcare relationship is at its most beneficial when cast in collaborative, even symbiotic, 
rather than competitive, terms.  
                                                          
1 See, for example, I Whiteman ‘The Fallacy of Choice in the Common Law and NHS Policy’ (2013) 21 Health 
Care Analysis 146. 
2 An aspect considered by MK Sheppard ‘Fallacy or Functionality: Law and Policy of Patient Treatment Choice 
in the NHS’ (2016) 24 Health Care Analysis 279. 
3 I Greener ‘Towards a history of choice in UK health policy’ (2009) 31(3) Sociology of Health & Illness 309. 
4 The NHS is organised in different ways across the four countries of the United Kingdom. For recent 
discussion, see N Timmins, The Four UK Health Systems: Learning from each Other (London: King’s Fund, 
2013).  
5 The Introductory Text to the 2012 Act provides that it is ‘An Act to establish and make provision about a 
National Health Service Commissioning Board [now NHS England] and clinical commissioning groups and to 
make other provision about the National Health Service in England;…’ 




Interaction between the NHS and the private healthcare sector attracts regular media 
attention due to its wide relevance7 and the antithetical juxtaposition of universal access and 
a ‘two-tier’ system – with descriptions such as ‘going private’ (understood here as a patient 
opting for private rather than NHS treatment)8 or ‘NHS privatisation’ (typically referencing 
the expansion of private sector delivery of NHS services from the early 2000s onwards).9 
Thus patient choice of NHS or private provider, specifically in the contexts of patients 
moving between the NHS and private healthcare sector and within NHS competition 
reforms, deserves more attention than it has hitherto received from the academic law 
community.10 Questions of applicability of competition law to the NHS11 have been 
considered, but movement between the NHS and private healthcare has been examined in 
the context of an overview of the NHS,12 or from the perspective of allocation and public 
law rather than competition.13 The private healthcare sector has also received little 
academic attention14 – although this may change with greater availability of information 
                                                          
7 This presupposes entitlement to NHS healthcare provision and the means to access private healthcare, so is 
clearly to be distinguished from instances of restrictions on access to NHS services for overseas visitors, or the 
ability of patients to exercise choice in respect of specialist commissioning, for example in the context of long-
term care where a patient may receive NHS Continuing Care Funding or a Personal Health Budget based on 
their complex healthcare needs and be entitled to exercise choice in respect of how this money is used. 
However, such examples could certainly form the basis for further research.  
8 L Donnelly ‘Numbers ‘going private’ for surgery soaring as NHS rationing deepens’ (The Telegraph, 11 
August 2018). Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust ‘Going private at Derby Hospitals NHS Foundation 
Trust’, available at  file:///C:/Users/owner/Downloads/Going%20Private.pdf (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
Oaks Hospital ‘Step-by-step guide to going private at Oaks’, available at https://www.oakshospital.co.uk/about-
us/going-private (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
9 H Cockburn ‘NHS privatisation soars as private companies win 70% of clinical contracts in England’ (The 
Independent, 30 December 2017). N Triggle ‘NHS privatisation: Why the fuss?’ (BBC Health, 20 February 
2015) available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31435842 (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
10 In contrast, patient choice has received more attention from thinktanks. See, for example, M Fotaki What 
market-based patient choice can’t do for the NHS: The theory and evidence of how choice works in halth care, 
(London: Centre for Health and the Public Interest, March 2014).  
11 See, for example, O Odudu 'Are State-owned healthcare providers undertakings subject to competition 
law?' (2011) 32(5) ECLR 231.  
12 K Syrett ‘The Organization of Health Care’ in JM Laing and JV McHale (ed) Principles of Medical Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 4th edn, 2017) ch 1. 
13 For example, E Jackson ‘Top-up Payments for Expensive Cancer Drugs: Rationing, Fairness and the NHS’ 
(2010) 73(3) MLR 399. K Syrett ‘Mixing Private and Public Treatment in the UK’s National Health Service: A 
Challenge to Core Constitutional Principles?’ (2010) 17 EJHL 235. 
14 An exception being the example of private medical insurance in the UK considered by S Thomson and E 
Mossialos ‘Private health insurance and the internal market’, in E Mossialos, G Permanand, R Baeten, TK 
Hervey (ed) Health Systems Governance in Europe – The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) ch 10. 
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about private providers15 following the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)’s 2014 
Private Healthcare Market Investigation.16   
This examination is timely given ongoing NHS cuts and calls for reform of the 2012 Act market 
regulation framework17 following the renewed focus on integrated care models in the NHS 
Five Year Forward View introduced in October 2014 and current development of 
Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs). The current development of the 
private healthcare sector by the CMA, coupled with growing interest in this by the Care 
Quality Commission (CQC)18 and recent concerns about patient safety19 may also have 
implications for patient choice. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets the scene by outlining the relationship 
between the NHS and private healthcare in terms of ‘going private’ and ‘NHS privatisation’. 
Section 2 builds on this by setting out two frameworks for patient choice within English 
healthcare: between the NHS and private healthcare, and within the NHS. Section 3 analyses 
the contested relationship between patient choice and competition. Section 4 examines 
patient choice within the context of the 2012 Act reforms and the CMA’s 2014 Private 
Healthcare Market Investigation. The article concludes by highlighting implications for the 
                                                          
15 Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) ‘Press Release – Better information for private patients moves 
closer’ (1 December 2014) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/better-information-for-private-
patients-moves-closer (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
16 CMA Private Healthcare Market Investigation Final Report (CMA25, 2014). 
17 House of Lords Select Committee on the Long-Term Sustainability of the NHS Report of Session 2016-17, 
‘The Long-term Sustainability of the NHS and Adult Social Care’ (5 April 2017). Recommendation 4 
(Paragraph 101). House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee, Integrated care: organizations, 
partnerships and systems. Seventh Report of Session 2017-19 (11 June 2018). Paragraphs 32-44.  
18 Care Quality Commission (CQC) ‘Consultation 3 – Our next phase of regulation. A more targeted, responsive 
and collaborative approach. Independent Healthcare’ (January 2018) available at 
https://www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/20180125_next_phase_consultation3_independent_healthcare-
final.pdf (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
19 Department of Health and Social Care Correspondence: Letter to independent healthcare providers (8 May 
2018) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/patient-safety-letter-to-independent-healthcare-
providers (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
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provision of services to patients and the surrounding policy regarding patient choice arising 
from the predominance of patient choice between the NHS and private healthcare. 
1. SETTING THE SCENE: ‘GOING PRIVATE’ AND ‘NHS PRIVATISATION’ –  THE 
CONTROVERSIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NHS AND PRIVATE 
HEALTHCARE IN ENGLAND  
Recent competition reforms of the English NHS can be understood by reference to 
accessing healthcare provision, and to controversies attached to the underlying commitment 
to the principle of universal access. To this end, two colloquialisms – ‘going private’ and 
‘NHS privatisation’ – are used to frame the discussion, although the defining lines between 
these may be more blurred in practice.20  
‘Going private’ refers to the situation where a patient entitled to NHS treatment decides to 
pay to receive treatment from an NHS or private provider, typically to avoid lengthy waiting 
lists, but may include instances where patients pay for treatment not available on the NHS. 
This can involve patients using private medical insurance (PMI), or their own resources as 
‘self-pay’ patients. Patient choice and movement between the NHS and private healthcare 
sector involves a change in classification – from ‘NHS patients’ to ‘private patients’. This is in 
line with the need, found in legislation21 and policy guidance, to maintain a strict separation 
between the two, and to avoid perceptions of NHS funding being used to subsidise private 
care. 
                                                          
20 See, for example, I Johnston ‘NHS privatisation exposed: Scale of treatment for paying patients at NHS 
hospitals revealed’ (The Independent, 30 September 2017). Patients paying for private treatment in NHS 
hospitals would be considered within the context of ‘going private’ in the current discussion.  
21 Successive National Health Service Acts have included sections governing the Secretary of State for Health’s 
duty regarding facilitating private provision with regard to using NHS facilities. See, for example, sections 58-
62 National Health Service Act 1977 as originally enacted, and section 267 National Health Service Act 2006.  
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This type of patient choice is governed by Department of Health (DH)22 policy guidance 
developed during the New Labour era (1997 – 2010). However, following the 2012 Act 
reforms, these policy documents have shaped more recent NHS England23 guidance and are 
currently being adopted by the Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs)24 established by the 
2012 Act. This raises questions about the fitness for purpose of this guidance in an 
environment which has seen at least two significant changes in the past ten years.  
Firstly, the 2012 Act reforms included the establishment of NHS England and NHS 
Improvement,25 with the aim of reducing day-to-day governmental oversight of the NHS. 
Nevertheless, the government sets the overall policy direction for NHS England via the 
NHS Mandate. It is to be noted that, as recently as March 2018,26 the Conservative 
government demonstrated commitment to the founding principles of the NHS – namely, as 
a service based on clinical need, not the ability to pay.  
However, the existence of these agencies and plans to develop new care models (such as 
Accountable Care Organisations) have raised questions about how such commitment can 
                                                          
22 Department of Health (DH) Guidance on NHS patients who wish to pay for additional private care (23 March 
2009). Department of Health (DH) A Code of Conduct for Private Practice – Recommended Standards of 
Practice for NHS Consultants (January 2004). 
23 NHS Commissioning Board (now NHS England) Commissioning Policy: Defining the boundaries between 
NHS and Private Healthcare (NHSCB/CP/12, April 2013).  
24 See, for example, Leeds CCGs Decision support framework for defining the boundaries between privately 
funded treatment and entitlement to NHS funding, under a range of circumstances (2015), available at 
https://www.leedsnorthccg.nhs.uk/publications/decision-support-framework-defining-boundaries-privately-
funded-treatment-entitlement-nhs-funding-range-circumstances/ (last accessed 30 September 2018); NHS 
Brighton and Hove Clinical Commissioning Group Managing the Boundaries of NHS and privately-funded 
healthcare (2015), available at https://www.gp.brightonandhoveccg.nhs.uk/files/managing-boundaries-nhs-and-
privately-funded-healthcarepdf (last accessed 30 September 2018); Ipswich and East Suffolk Clinical 
Commissioning Group Commissioning Policy – Defining the boundaries between NHS and private healthcare 
(2017), available at 
http://www.ipswichandeastsuffolkccg.nhs.uk/Portals/1/Content/Members%20Area/Clinical%20Area/Low%20pr
iority%20procedures/Clinical%20prioritisation%20policies/Private-
NHS%20Boundaries%20Policy%20docxFINAL%20IP%20and%20E.pdf (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
25 This emerged in April 2016 and combines Monitor, the sectoral regulator with competition functions, and the 
NHS Trust Development Authority, two bodies created by the 2012 Act. 
26 Department of Health The Government’s Revised Mandate to NHS England for 2017-2018 (March 2018). 
Paragraph 1.1. Page 7.  
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play out in practice and the future extent of the Secretary of State for Health’s duty to 
promote a comprehensive health service27 in the unfolding post-2012 Act landscape.28  
Secondly, the private healthcare sector has been undergoing development in two – related, 
yet discrete – ways: by the 2012 Act potentially providing for the expansion of Private 
Patient Units (PPUs) operated by NHS Foundation Trusts,29 and by the CMA’s 2014 Market 
Investigation. The use of NHS facilities to treat private patients is not new: a ‘peculiarly 
British compromise’30 of ‘pay-beds’ in NHS hospitals31 was reached by provision being made 
by section 5 of the National Health Service Act 1946 for consultants to continue private 
practice alongside their NHS workload in order to implement the NHS.32 A more recent 
development is the CMA taking enforcement action against NHS providers operating in the 
private healthcare market, evidenced in 2017 with regard to providing information to 
facilitate choice by private patients.33   
This places doctors advising patients about moving from the NHS to the private sector in a 
more complicated regulatory landscape than that envisaged by the policy documents now 
used by the CCGs. Furthermore, the DH/CCGs and the CMA appear to continue to 
                                                          
27 Under section 1 National Health Service Act 2006 as amended by the 2012 Act. Previously, the Secretary of 
State’s duty had related to the provision (rather than promotion) of a comprehensive health service. See further 
on this point, Syrett above n 12. 
28 Hutchinson & Anor, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care & Anor 
(Rev 1) [2018] EWHC 1698 (Admin). 
29 Section 165 of the 2012 Act operates to remove the limit on the income NHS Foundation Trusts can make 
from private patients. 
30 N Timmins The Five Giants – A Biography of the Welfare State (London: William Collins, 2017), p 332. 
31 This compromise was complicated further by the distinction drawn between ‘pay-beds’ (for private patients) 
and ‘amenity beds’ (for NHS patients who wished to pay for the privacy of a single room, but would otherwise 
remain NHS patients). Aneurin Bevan, considered the architect of the NHS, was highly critical of ‘pay beds’, 
but favoured an increase of ‘amenity beds’. A Bevan ‘A Free Health Service’ in A Bevan In Place of Fear 
(London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1952), p 92. 
32 A move described by Bevan in characteristically colourful terms as ‘stuff[ing] their mouths with gold’. See 
Timmins, above n 30, p 115. 
33 CMA ‘Press Release – CMA demands action from hospitals on private healthcare information’ (31 August 
2017) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-demands-action-from-hospitals-on-private-
healthcare-information (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
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produce guidance and frameworks largely independent of each other when clearly there is a 
need for each to acknowledge the other to a greater extent.  
This development of patient choice and movement between the NHS and private healthcare 
sector has produced a complex dynamic. It is true that Hirschman’s model34 can be used to 
a limited extent to analyse patients demonstrating ‘loyalty’ to the NHS, expressing ‘voice’ to 
encourage responsiveness, or ultimately opting for ‘exit’ by ‘going private’. This appears 
consistent both with wider social trends towards consumerism, and perceptions in other 
public-private systems that private sector competition produces better quality of care35 may 
hold in England as well. However, the model does not allow for the underlying link found in 
advertisements for PPUs in NHS Foundation Trust hospitals: ‘by choosing to go private you 
can also help the NHS’,36 and considerations that the framework underpinning patient 
movement and referral between the NHS and private healthcare is such as to inhibit clear 
directions of travel towards either consumerism or mutualism.37 Furthermore, the idea of 
‘going private’ becomes simplistic in light of the reverse direction of travel: when private 
patients are transferred to NHS hospitals. Such movement from the private healthcare 
sector to the NHS may be motivated more by clinical need – for example because an 
emergency situation arises – than consumer behaviour. Nevertheless, metrics relating to 
such referrals are to be included in information made available to private patients,38 which 
                                                          
34 A O Hirschman Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States, (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1990).  
35 As evidenced by research in Australia. See, for example, PR Ward, P Rokkas et al ‘A Qualitative Study of 
Patient (Dis)Trust in Public and Private Hospitals: the Importance of Choice and Pragmatic Acceptance for Trust 
Considerations in South Australia’, (2015) 15 BMC Health Services Research 297. A Shmueli and E Savage 
‘Private and Public Patients in Public Hospitals in Australia’, (2014) 115 (2-3) Health Policy 189. 
36 For example, Norfolk and Norwich University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust ‘Private Patients’, available 
at http://www.nnuh.nhs.uk/departments/private-patients/ (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
37 R Wiles and J Higgins ‘Doctor-patient Relationships in the Private Sector: Patients’ Perceptions’ (1996) 18(3) 
Sociology of Health & Illness 341. 
38 CMA, above n 15. 
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may suggest that these may influence a patient’s choice of a specific private provider, or 
even the decision to ‘go private’.  
This wider relationship between the NHS and the private healthcare sector and patient 
choice within this has provided a backdrop for implementing competition reforms, in 
particular the expansion of private sector delivery of NHS services – or ‘NHS privatisation’ 
– in the early 21st century.39 Indeed the link was made explicit by Tony Blair: 
‘The overriding principle is clear. We should give poorer patients … the same range of 
choice [i.e. of a private provider] the rich have always enjoyed’.40 
Thus under New Labour’s choice and competition agenda,41 NHS patients were encouraged 
to exercise choice of an NHS or private provider in respect of a first outpatient 
appointment for elective referrals, to support the expansion of private sector delivery of 
NHS services.42  This policy was subsequently put on a statutory footing – thus ‘juridified’43 – 
by the coalition government enacting the 2013 Regulations.44 Patient choice was further 
                                                          
39 Department of Health The NHS Plan – A Plan for Investment, A Plan for Reform (Cm 4818-l, July 2000) 
paragraph 11.7. NHS Partners Network/NHS Confederation 15 Years of Concordat: reflection and renewal 
(June 2015), available at http://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/2015/06/nhs-partners-network-15-years-of-
concordat-reflection (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
40 T Blair ‘We Must Not Waste This Precious Period of Power’, speech given at South Camden Community 
College, London, 23 January 2003. Cited in Z Cooper Competition in Hospital Services, OECD Working Party 
No.2 on Competition and Regulation (DAF/COMP/WP2(2012)2, 2012). 
41 For discussion of this within a healthcare context and more generally, see J Le Grand The Other Invisible 
Hand – Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition (Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 
2007).  
42 Although this expansion can refer to various aspects of NHS provision, from the specific Independent Sector 
Treatment Centre (ISTC) programme, to more general, and increasingly widespread, private sector delivery of 
NHS services. For an overview of the former, see The King’s Fund Briefing Independent Sector Treatment 
Centres (London: The King’s Fund, October 2009). 
43 The term used by Davies in an excellent early overview of the 2012 Act reforms. ACL Davies ‘This Time, 
It’s For Real’ (2013) 76(3) MLR 564. 
44 In response to the NHS Future Forum’s concerns about the proposed 2012 Act reforms, the coalition 
government volunteered to put pre-existing New Labour guidance – the NHS Principles and Rules for 
Competition and Cooperation (2010) – on a statutory footing rather than design new rules governing patient 
choice, competition and procurement. Department of Health Government Response to the NHS Future Forum 
Report (CM 8113, June 2011). Paragraph 5.16. 
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‘enshrined’ by the NHS Constitution45 under New Labour, and this document has been 
retained and updated by subsequent governments, most recently in 2015.   
However, what might be considered ‘NHS privatisation’ extends beyond patient choice 
policies, further blurring the distinction with the concept of ‘going private’. This is because  
‘privatisation’ can be considered a misnomer insofar as a distinction can be drawn between 
private providers undertaking work for the NHS, and an NHS provider being taken into 
private ownership.46 Examples of the former can be seen from the inception of the NHS in 
1948, and include elective, diagnostic, musculoskeletal, pharmaceutical and children’s 
services,47 supporting the view that the relationship between the NHS and private 
healthcare sector is at its best when cast in a collaborative light. Perhaps the closest 
example of the latter is still to be found in recent experiments with franchising 
arrangements which met with limited success.48 Insofar as NHS patients may not be aware 
that a private provider is delivering the service they are receiving, such examples of public-
private interaction need to be seen ultimately as separate from patient choice within the 
contexts either of ‘going private’ or ‘NHS privatisation’.  
By examining patient choice in the context of recent NHS competition reforms (‘NHS 
privatisation’) and the wider relationship between the NHS and the private healthcare 
sector (‘going private’), this article builds on Whiteman’s and Sheppard’s conceptions of 
                                                          
45 Department of Health and Social Care, NHS Constitution for England available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-nhs-constitution-for-england (last accessed 30 September 
2018). 
46 However, with regard to the potentially detrimental effects for the core principles of universal access 
underpinning the NHS, and concerns that private providers may offer a different level of service to public 
providers, it might equally be considered that there is at best only a fine line to be drawn between NHS 
providers being taken into private ownership and private sector delivery of NHS services. 
47 For an overview, see NHS Partners Network / NHS Confederation Working together since 1948: celebrating 
70 years of partnership between the NHS and independent sector, July 2018, available at 
https://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/2018/07/working-together-since-1948-celebrating-70-years-of-
partnership-nhs-and-independent-sector (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
48 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), ‘Hinchingbrooke Hospital: Circle to withdraw from contract’ (9 




patient choice as, respectively, ‘fallacious’49 or ‘functional’,50 to show how the present 
narrow, competition-related understanding of patient choice can be considered fallacious 
and yet functional.  
Patient choice can be considered ‘fallacious’ in the context of ‘going private’, because the 
choice may not necessarily be between two identical treatment options. In this sense a 
patient paying for drugs not available on the NHS can be distinguished from a patient paying 
for a scan in order to avoid NHS waiting lists. Patient choice can also be considered 
‘fallacious’ in the context of ‘NHS privatisation’ because the availability of such choice in a 
given region may be restricted, or because, as will be seen, motivation for implementing 
patient choice policies may lie as much with a private provider as a patient. 
Patient choice can perhaps most obviously be considered ‘functional’ in the context of ‘NHS 
privatisation’ as providing the necessary demand function to balance the expanded private 
sector supply of NHS services, thus underpinning competition reforms both under New 
Labour and subsequently the 2012 Act. However, the ‘functionality’ of patient choice in 
maintaining, and even developing, the wider relationship between the private healthcare 
sector and the NHS should not be underestimated. The symbiotic nature of this relationship 
may be attributed in part to the supplementary nature of private healthcare and PMI,51 
which creates a situation in which governmental support for the NHS may influence access 
to private healthcare. This has been recognised previously by the competition authority: 
                                                          
49 Within the wider context of informed consent, Whiteman suggests the use of the word ‘choice’ is ‘fallacious’, 
and that merely expressing ‘preference’ is a more accurate reflection of the patient’s situation. Whiteman, above 
n 1. 
50 In response to Whiteman, Sheppard suggests that patient choice can be ‘functional’ by providing a 
destabilisation mechanism at all three levels of healthcare – from government policy (macro level), via 
purchasing/commissioning decisions (meso level) to the doctor-patient relationship (micro level). Sheppard, 
above n 2. 
51 In contrast to other healthcare systems, where health insurance may be complementary (France) or even 
mandatory (the Netherlands). See further, Thomson and Mossialos above n 14. 
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‘The NHS dominates healthcare in the UK. Without it private elective and acute healthcare 
would not exist in its present form, and it must be seen in this context.’52  
More recently, private healthcare companies have also effectively acknowledged this by 
using income from NHS contracts to compensate for a decline in private patient numbers 
during the economic crisis.53 Indeed, at the time of writing (September 2018), the additional 
dynamic of the NHS supporting private healthcare providers by encouraging CCGs to refer 
NHS patients has featured in the general media.54 
This background of interaction between the NHS and the private healthcare sector, and its 
influence on recent competition reforms, means discussion of patient choice can now be 
structured around two frameworks. 
2. CONCEPTUALISING PATIENT CHOICE WITHIN TWO FRAMEWORKS 
This section builds on the foregoing by outlining two frameworks for patient choice: between 
the NHS and the private healthcare sector, and choice within the NHS, which can be linked 
to ‘going private’ and ‘NHS privatisation’, respectively.  
(a) Patient choice between the NHS and private healthcare sector – the ‘NHS 
patient – private patient’ framework 
Patient choice between the NHS and private healthcare sector has been governed by 
successive sets of rules from the mid-1980s onwards,55 and finds its current expression in 
                                                          
52 Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) Private medical services – A report on agreements and 
practices relating to charges for the supply of private medical services by NHS consultants (1994), p 15. 
53 A number of private hospital groups recorded in their annual reports that the increased demand for private 
provision within the NHS and this new income from the NHS was used to compensate for falls in private patient 
numbers. See S Arora, A Charlesworth, E Kelly and G Stoye Public payment and private provision – the changing 
landscape of health care in the 2000s. (London: Institute for Fiscal Studies / Nuffield Trust, May 2013), p 30. 
54 G Plimmer ‘UK Private Hospitals suffer as NHS brings work back in house’ (The Times, 21 July 2018). D 
Campbell ‘NHS bosses urge hospitals to send patients to private firms’ (The Guardian, 30 August 2018). 
55 Jackson, above n 13 at footnote 2 notes that ‘The Code of Conduct for Private Practice: Recommended 
Standards of Practice for NHS Consultants (London: Department of Health, 2004) replaced The Code of 
Conduct for Private Practice: guidance for NHS staff (London: Department of Health, 2003), which itself 
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NHS England guidance56 which acknowledges earlier DH policy documentation.57 There are 
two aspects to this guidance, namely, clarification of when (and where) patients may choose 
to move between the NHS and private healthcare sector, and who may be involved in giving 
effect to the choice. 
Overall, much is made of the underlying principles of the NHS as a service based on clinical 
need, not the ability to pay, and the consequent need to avoid real or perceived instances of 
private healthcare being subsidised by the NHS. NHS England conceptualises this as ‘co-
funding of NHS care’58, which is prohibited, and is defined as 
‘… any arrangement under which the cost of an episode of care within the NHS (for 
example an out-patient visit, an operation, etc) is part funded by an NHS 
commissioner and part funded privately by the patient.’ 
Thus, prima facie, a patient is not permitted to receive both NHS and private treatment 
within a single episode of care. This appears to reflect a previous policy direction, namely, 
that ‘either NHS care or private care’ is available, and patients lose their entitlement to 
NHS care while they are purchasing additional treatment.59 However, the present situation 
appears more nuanced, such that at least two permutations60 are conceivable for patients to 
receive NHS and private care at the same time: either in the same setting, or in a separate 
                                                          
replaced Management of private practice in health service hospitals in England and Wales (London: Department 
of Health 1986).’  
56 NHS England, above n 23.  
57 DH (2009) and (2004), both above n 22.  
58 In contrast to ‘co-payment’, which is permitted by virtue of the Government passing Regulations which 
require patients to make a contribution to the overall cost of NHS-commissioned care. See NHS England, above 
n 23 at page 13. An example of ‘co-payment’ in this definition would be the levying of prescription charges. 
However, the terminology is contested: this article uses the definitions and terminology of NHS England to 
discuss ‘co-funding’ and ‘co-payment’. Elsewhere, ‘co-payment’ has been used to describe what may be 
considered a ‘co-funding’ arrangement using NHS England terminology. See, for example, A Weale and S 
Clark ‘Co-payments in the NHS: an analysis of the normative arguments’, (2010) 5 Health Economics, Policy 
and Law 225. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. NHS top-ups and voucher schemes for specified unfunded drugs are also referenced. 
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setting. A clear example of receiving NHS and private care in the same setting would be 
‘top-up’ payments to receive drugs not routinely available on the NHS following 
recommendations expanding access to private drugs for NHS cancer patients.61 With regard 
to receiving NHS and private care in different settings, NHS England guidance is explicit that: 
‘If a patient is an in-patient at an NHS hospital, any privately-funded care must be delivered 
to the patient in a separate building or separate part of the hospital, with a clear division 
between the privately-funded and NHS-funded elements of the care, unless separation 
would pose overriding concerns regarding patient safety.’62  
The separation of treatment setting also means a differentiation in patient status: patients 
who have started private treatment (‘private patients’) are able to move back into the NHS 
(and be classified as ‘NHS patients’), and are treated as if they had commenced their 
treatment with the NHS.63  
Whilst distinctions between treatment settings and patient status are key to patient choice 
within the ‘NHS patient-private patient’ framework, other factors are involved. Notably, DH 
guidance about managing the separation of NHS and private healthcare further distinguishes 
between a doctor (consultant) initiating discussions about providing private services for 
NHS patients, and a patient seeking information about how to access a private treatment 
option.64 It states unequivocally that  
                                                          
61 M Richards Improving access to medicines for NHS patients – A report for the Secretary of State for Health 
by Professor Mike Richards CBE (November 2008). 
62 NHS England, above n 23, pages 9-10. 
63 Ibid, paragraph 3, page 8. 
64 DH (2004), above n 22, paragraphs 5.5 and 5.6, page 11. 
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‘In the course of their NHS duties and responsibilities consultants should not initiate 
discussions about providing private services for NHS patients, nor should they ask other 
NHS staff to initiate such discussions on their behalf.’65 
Guidance by the British Medical Association (BMA)66 reflects this, elaborating that  
‘… it is not appropriate for consultants to: 
 use their NHS patient lists to initiate discussion about their private practice; 
 suggest to patients who are placed on a waiting list for NHS treatment that the 
treatment could be provided more quickly on a private basis; 
 raise the issue of private practice obliquely, for example by handing the patient a 
business card containing the address of both the NHS hospital and the doctor’s 
private consulting rooms, or adding the private clinic address to NHS letterheads.’ 
However, once a patient initiates discussions about private treatment, both the DH and 
BMA guidance make clear that NHS doctors should provide full and accurate information 
about the private services they or their NHS organisation can provide.67 Thus, consistent 
with the rules about keeping NHS and private treatment as separate as possible, the onus 
appears to be on the patient to exercise choice of NHS or private provider.  
Despite this apparent clarity, the extent to which such distinctions are maintained in 
practice appears unclear. Indeed, the BMA acknowledges that, from a patient’s perspective, 
maintaining a strict separation between NHS and private healthcare (in terms of what can be 
said in what context) may appear unduly bureaucratic.68  As part of the research 
                                                          
65 Ibid, paragraph 2.9, page 3. 
66 British Medical Association (BMA), ‘The interface between NHS and private treatment: a practical guide for 
doctors in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Guidance from the BMA Medical Ethics Department’, May 
2009. Page 3. 
67 DH (2004), above n 22, paragraph 2.10. BMA above n 66, page 4. 
68 BMA, above n 66, page 5. 
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underpinning what became the CMA’s Private Healthcare Market Investigation, data was 
collected from a sample of forty patients about ‘the patient journey’ from the NHS into the 
private healthcare sector. Within this sample, four ‘pathways’ were identified: led by GPs, 
NHS hospitals, PMI companies and patients themselves. The following trends were 
observed: the GP-led pathway comprised nineteen patients, the self-led pathway twelve 
patients, the NHS hospital-led pathway five patients and the PMI pathway four patients.69 
Whilst the sample size may raise questions, the study is useful for testing assumptions about 
when and how patients access private healthcare, since information about this within the 
English context is limited.70 It is unsurprising that most patients should opt for the ‘GP-led’ 
pathway in view of the ‘gatekeeper’ function which GPs serve within English healthcare. In 
other words, the GP would make a referral of a patient to a private provider, and it may 
typically be only at that stage that the patient contacts their PMI provider.71 In contrast, it 
appears possible for ‘self-pay’ patients to contact a private provider directly.72 More notable 
is the relatively limited role for consultants in facilitating a patient journey from the NHS 
into private healthcare,73 and the discrepancy between ‘self-pay’ patients and PMI companies. 
The limited function of PMI companies can perhaps be explained by the link established 
between NHS use of private providers (leading to a decrease in waiting times) and 
decreased demand for PMI,74 coupled with more general considerations such as the risk 
rating of insurance premiums and eligibility requirements.75 
                                                          
69 See ‘Table A: Pathways into Private Treatment’, page 4.  Office of Fair Trading (OFT), The Patient Journey – 
Research to support the OFT’s private healthcare market study (August 2011).  
70 Although studies elsewhere can provide insight into patient motivations for selecting private over public 
healthcare – see discussions from Australia at n 35 above. See also A Anell ‘The Public-Private Pendulum – 
Patient Choice and Equity in Sweden’ (2015) 372(1) New England Journal of Medicine 1. 
71 OFT above n 69, p 4. 
72 Ibid, p 19. 
73 Ibid, p 6. 
74 A Bíró and M Hellowell ‘Public-private sector interactions and the demand for supplementary health 
insurance in the United Kingdom’ (2016) 120(7) Health Policy 840. 
75 A Kiil ‘What characterises the privately insured in universal health care systems? A review of the empirical 
evidence’ (2012) 106(1) Health Policy 60. 
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The foregoing gives an insight into the complexity of NHS-private healthcare interactions in 
view of the hurdle of the ‘co-funding’ prohibition. A recent Private Member’s Bill76 proposes 
to permit ‘co-funding’, and this may appear to offer a ‘quick fix’ to the seemingly intractable 
problem of managing access to both NHS and private healthcare. However, in view of the 
wider regulatory landscape encompassing both the NHS and private healthcare sector, and 
the sensitivities attached to the NHS in particular, this should be treated with significant 
caution. 
 (b) Patient choice within the NHS – the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework 
This framework is concerned with the scope for NHS patients to exercise choice of 
provider within their NHS treatment. It is underpinned by related, yet discrete, narratives 
emerging from legislation and policy documentation, specifically the NHS Constitution and 
the 2013 Regulations relating to patient choice. 
(I) THE NHS CONSTITUTION 
NHS patients have ‘rights’, including choice, enshrined in the NHS Constitution.77 The rights 
regarding ‘Informed Choice’ can be linked to a wider legal basis with regard to patients 
choosing GP practice, expressing a preference for a particular doctor within a GP practice, 
and having access to transparent data to facilitate choice.78 Of particular relevance to the 
present discussion is the ‘right’ for NHS patients to make choices about the services 
commissioned by NHS bodies,79 and the suggestion that the options available will develop 
                                                          
76 National Health Service (Co-funding and Co-Payment) |HC Bill|2017-19 available at 
https://services.parliament.uk/Bills/2017-19/nationalhealthservicecofundingandcopayment.html (last accessed 
30 September 2018). The second reading was scheduled for 25 January 2019, having been rescheduled from 
May and June 2018. 
77 For a discussion, see Syrett, above n 12, pp 27-31. 
78 See DH, The Handbook to the NHS Constitution for England (27 July 2015) pp 68-74. 
79 NHS Constitution, above n 45, Section 3a, page 6. 
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over time and depend on individual needs.80 This suggests a clear focus on patients, but does 
not clarify the nature of the choice available, and appears constrained by NHS England 
guidance:  
‘Choice does not mean that a patient can change commissioning policy by seeking to 
extend the range of treatments the NHS is prepared to commission or fund for that 
patient or for patients generally.’81 
(II) THE 2013 REGULATIONS 
The rights of NHS patients to choose an NHS or private provider are also protected in the 
context of competition reforms by the 2013 Regulations which create standing for a 
potentially wide group of possible complainants – ‘providers, patients and other third 
parties’ – to ask NHS Improvement to investigate a decision by a CCG or NHS England.82 
The 2013 Regulations comprise a framework83 establishing a general procurement objective 
and requirements which is supplemented by specific provisions relating to procurement, 
patient choice and competition. The provisions relating to procurement84 and 
anticompetitive behaviour85 in particular, have raised questions about whether these comply 
                                                          
80 DH above n 78. This particular ‘right’ is derived from Part 8 of the National Health Service Commissioning 
Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing Rules) (Amendment) Regulations 
2013, SI 2013/2891. 
81 See NHS Commissioning Board (now NHS England) Commissioning Policy: Choice NHSCB/CP/11, April 
2013, paragraph 8, page 6. 
82 Monitor, Substantive Guidance on the Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations (19 
December 2013) p 8. 
83 Regulations 2 and 3, 2013 Regulations. 
84 Regulations 5-9, 2013 Regulations. 
85 Regulation 10, 2013 Regulations. 
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with EU law,86 with it being suggested that the procurement provisions offer at most an 
alternative recourse87 to general public procurement rules for disgruntled bidders.  
The patient choice regulations relate to choice of primary care provider88 and choice of 
alternative provider,89 and are linked to duties enshrined in the National Health Service 
Commissioning Board and Clinical Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing 
Rules) Regulations 2012 (‘the 2012 Regulations’).90 The 2013 Regulations grant NHS 
Improvement power to investigate a complaint under certain Standing Rules (SRs) of the 
2012 Regulations.91 These SRs impose on CCGs and NHS England duties which enshrine 
previous patient choice policies, namely, patients requiring an elective referral must be 
offered a choice of provider in respect of their first outpatient appointment,92 and 
arrangements must be made to ensure that the availability of this particular choice is 
publicised and promoted.93 There is also a transitional provision relating to the 
responsibilities of CCGs where such choice is not offered.94  
Whilst these duties are wide-ranging, specific exceptions apply to the duty to publicise and 
promote the availability of choice,95 namely in respect of cancer services subject to the 2-
week maximum waiting time, maternity services or mental health services,96 or any service 
                                                          
86 A Sánchez Graells ‘New rules for health care procurement in the UK: a critical assessment from the 
perspective of EU economic law’ (2015) 1 PPLR 16-30. With regard to competition law, see further M Guy 
Competition Policy in Healthcare – Frontiers in Insurance-based and Taxation-funded Systems, (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2019), ch. 2.  
87 S Smith, D Owens, E Heard ‘New procurement legislation for English healthcare bodies – the National Health 
Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) Regulations (No.2) 2013’ (2013) 4 PPLR 109. 
88 Regulation 11, 2013 Regulations. 
89 Regulation 12, 2013 Regulations.  
90 SI 2012/2996. As amended by the National Health Service Commissioning Board and Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing Rules) (Amendments) Regulations 2013 SI 2013/2891. 
91 Regulation 13, 2013 Regulations. 
92 Standing Rule 39, 2012 Regulations. 
93 Standing Rule 42, 2012 Regulations.  
94 Standing Rule 43, 2012 Regulations. 
95 Standing Rule 39, 2012 Regulations. 
96 Standing Rule 40(1), 2012 Regulations.  
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requiring urgent care.97 Additionally, such choice is not extended to any person detained 
under the Mental Health Act 1983, detained in or on temporary release from prison, or 
serving as a member of the armed forces.98  
At the time of writing (September 2018), no recourse has been had to the 2013 Regulations 
governing patient choice of primary care provider or alternative provider.99 The sole case to 
date involving the 2012 Regulations100 regarding the commissioning of elective services in the 
North-West of England101 is discussed in Section 4 below. 
(c) Overview – where can choice between the NHS and private healthcare be 
exercised in light of the two frameworks? 
The ability of patients to exercise choice of NHS or private provider has changed over time 
and continues to develop as boundaries between NHS and private healthcare become more 
porous. As scope for movement between the NHS and private healthcare (and indeed, the 
development of competition reforms) can vary across England, the present discussion is 
concerned with the general principles, rules and relevant law underpinning this movement, 
with general distinctions being drawn between primary and secondary healthcare provision. 
(I) PRIMARY HEALTHCARE PROVISION – CHOICE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONER (GP) 
From the inception of the NHS, the ‘gatekeeper’ function of GPs in accessing healthcare 
services established a need for patients to register with a GP practice. Indeed, the launch of 
the NHS was accompanied by the exhortation to ‘Choose Your Doctor Now’,102 although 
                                                          
97 Standing Rule 40(2), 2012 Regulations. 
98 Standing Rule 41, 2012 Regulations. 
99 Regulations 11 and 12, 2013 Regulations. 
100 Regulation 13, 2013 Regulations. 
101 Monitor Case CCD 05/13 Commissioning of elective services in Blackpool and Fylde and Wyre Final 
Report.  
102 As featured in NHS information leaflets and public information films. See, for example, British Pathé, ‘New 
National Health Service’ (1944-1945), available at https://www.britishpathe.com/video/new-national-health-
service (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
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this was understood in terms of forming an associational relationship that was 
professionally-oriented and long term,103 rather than being linked with consumerism or 
development of competition. Nevertheless, choice of GP can be linked to both frameworks. 
Within the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework, treatment of patients who pay to see 
a GP appears governed by the general DH rules about separating NHS and private patients. 
This would suggest that a GP who sees private patients outside of NHS surgery times is not 
in breach of the rules discussed previously, since the separation between NHS and private 
patients is maintained. This appears to be the logic underpinning the recent creation of a GP 
practice catering exclusively for private patients.104 Nevertheless, the subject appears 
particularly controversial,105 and arguably rightly so in view of the GPs’ gatekeeper function, 
insofar as it may be difficult to distinguish between acting in a patient’s best interests from a 
purely clinical perspective and avoiding any suggestion of benefits accruing to a GP or a 
private healthcare provider. Indeed, it is worth noting that referrals by GPs to private 
providers have been linked to questions of corruption regarding benefit and incentive 
schemes operated by the latter,106 and to competition problems in the private healthcare 
sector.107 
Within the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework, competition reforms have also included 
examination of general practice with a view to improving the information available to 
patients and seeking to ensure that patients can exercise choice of GP.108 Research 
conducted for NHS Improvement suggested that convenience, access and quality are key 
                                                          
103 Greener, above n 3. 
104 ‘Dorset Private GP Service’ available at http://dorsetprivategp.co.uk/ (last accessed 30 September 2018). 
105 D Campbell ‘Fears of two-tier NHS as GPs allow fee-paying patients to jump the queue’ (The Guardian, 8 
February 2017). 
106 J Gornall ‘The truth about cash for referrals’ (2015) 350 BMJ h396. F Godlee ‘Medical corruption in the 
UK’ (2015) 350 BMJ h506.  
107 CMA above n 16. Section 10.4. 
108 Monitor Improving GP Services: Commissioners and Patient Choice (1 June 2015). 
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considerations for patients in selecting a GP.109 This is significant in view of concerns that 
patients sometimes go to Accident and Emergency departments for relatively minor 
complaints, or when no GP appointment is readily available.110 The preservation of patient 
choice is also identified as a factor that NHS Improvement will consider when reviewing 
whether collaborations between GP practices, or between GP practices and hospitals 
breach competition law, the public procurement rules or the 2013 Regulations.111 
(II) SECONDARY HEALTHCARE PROVISION: PATIENT CHOICE BEYOND GP REFERRAL 
Choice within the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework is subject to a particular 
separation of NHS and private treatment. Examples given by DH guidance suggest that, in 
practice, the circumstances in which a clear separation can be drawn are varied and flexible, 
ranging from a patient choosing to pay for an unfunded (private) cancer drug to be taken 
either in addition to, or concurrently with NHS chemotherapy treatment,112 to a patient 
accessing private physiotherapy following a hip replacement operation on the NHS.113 
Consensus on where such a separation cannot be drawn emerges with the example of a 
patient needing a cataract operation and their request to insert a multifocal lens not 
routinely available on the NHS being declined.114 
Choice of NHS or private provider within the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework is more 
restricted, and limited to NHS patients exercising choice of provider in respect of a first 
outpatient appointment regarding elective care, or in instances where waiting times have 
been exceeded, as demonstrated by recourse under the 2013 Regulations.115 Nevertheless, 
                                                          
109 Ipsos Mori ‘Exploring Patient Choice in GP services’ (December 2014). 
110 L Donnelly ‘NHS officials float idea of banning patients from going to A&E without prior permission’, (The 
Telegraph 13 October 2017). 
111 Monitor Choice and competition toolkit: Scenarios for GPs working together (1 June 2015). 
112 DH (2009), above n 22, Case studies (a) and (b). Page 10, case studies (a) and (b). 
113 Ibid. Page 10, case study (c). 
114 Ibid. Page 10, case study (d). See also NHS England, above n 23, paragraph 11, page 10. 
115 Regulation 13. 
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it appears that there is a greater onus on doctors to make patients aware of their ‘right’ to 
choose. Information about providers is available online as part of online booking systems 
such as the NHS e-Referral service,116 as well as more generally via portals such as 
iwantgreatcare.org.  
The foregoing discussions reveal certain common features in the guidance underpinning the 
‘NHS patient – private patient’ and ‘NHS patient choice’ frameworks. For example, while 
questions of when and where patients may exercise choice are addressed to a certain 
extent, questions of who is the real agent exercising choice may emerge. Thus in the ‘NHS 
patient – private patient’ framework, the dynamic within the doctor-patient relationship may 
be questioned on a strict interpretation of the guidance, whereas in the ‘NHS patient 
choice’ framework, patients represent only one complainant with standing under the 2013 
Regulations. Against these considerations, it is possible to examine how patient choice 
relates to competition. 
3. UNPACKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATIENT CHOICE AND 
COMPETITION  
As noted above, the New Labour patient choice policies provided a demand function to the 
supply function of expanding private sector delivery of NHS services. Although this suggests 
a clear link between patient choice and competition, the reality is more nuanced. Indeed, 
there may be more of a logical connection between patient choice and competition with 
regard to the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework than the ‘NHS patient choice’ 
framework. Factors examined here in determining this, include: the reconception of patients 
as ‘consumers’, and whether the CMA regards patients as the only healthcare ‘consumers’ in 
                                                          
116 NHS Choices, ‘What is the NHS e-Referral service?’ available at 




need of protection against anticompetitive behaviour; whether patient choice is a 
prerequisite for competition; and whether there is a link between patient choice and 
competition law (understood here as the provisions governing anticompetitive agreements 
and abuse of dominance).117 This wide-ranging discussion requires a move beyond the two 
frameworks as follows. 
(a) From two frameworks to four categories: who is the ‘consumer’ in English 
healthcare? 
Reconceptualising patients as ‘consumers’ in NHS competition reforms raises at least two 
concerns. One is recognised in the context of citizenship, namely that ‘we do not come to 
the marketplace as equals’.118 This reflects the controversies attached to the ‘NHS patient – 
private patient’ framework – notably the potential conflict arising from ongoing commitment 
to maintaining NHS healthcare provision on the basis of clinical need, not the ability to pay. 
A second concern is a shift in status from passive patients to active consumers,119 which has 
implications for the doctor-patient relationship in both frameworks. Within the ‘NHS 
patient – private patient’ framework, the aforementioned DH guidance may be interpreted 
as casting doctors in a somewhat paternalistic light by delineating a framework for sharing 
information with patients. This appears out of step with more recent developments – the 
2012 Act reforms and CMA development of the private healthcare market – which appear 
to strengthen the patient’s position. Further, this may be concerning since this guidance was 
produced against the backdrop of competition as conceived by New Labour, yet appears to 
be replicated without revision by CCGs in the post-2012 Act environment. Alternatively, 
                                                          
117 The rules governing state aid (broadly, government subsidies) are distinct from patient choice, so are beyond 
the scope of this article.  
118 T Prosser The Limits of Competition Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p 9. 
119 J Tritter, M Koivusalo, E Ollila and P Dorfman Globalisation, Markets and Health Policy – Redrawing the 
Patient as Consumer (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010). See also comments by Lord Kerr about the more active role 
of patients who are increasingly treated as consumers in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (General 
Medical Council intervening) [2015] UKSC 11 at paragraph 75. 
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the DH and BMA guidance may be considered to strengthen a patient’s hand in seeking 
access to private healthcare, with the doctor being re-cast as facilitator.  
In contrast, within the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework, the doctor’s role may clearly be 
construed as more paternalistic – by making patients aware that they may choose a private 
provider in certain circumstances. This is consistent with the logic that a ‘patients-as-
consumers’ narrative may be misplaced in the context of the NHS, which – in contrast to 
the private healthcare market – can at most share only some standard market 
characteristics, with provider exit proving most controversial.  
The ‘patients as consumers’ narrative is further complicated by the consumer function of 
NHS commissioners and PMI companies. Whilst the CMA distinguishes broadly between 
the NHS and private healthcare sector, two further permutations are necessary to reflect 
complex interactions: private providers treating NHS patients, and NHS providers treating 
private patients.120  Who the ‘consumer’ is within these four categories121 can be 






















Category 4  
Private 




                                                          
120 These permutations reflect the separation of purchasing and providing functions which characterised 
successive competition and market reforms from the ‘NHS internal market’ in 1990 via New Labour reforms, 
particularly the expansion of private sector delivery of NHS services and patient choice policies, to the 2012 Act 
reforms. See further Davies above n 43, and Guy, above n 86, ch 1. 
121 This is developed further in Guy above n 86 and is a modified version of categories used to delineate the 
private healthcare market and discuss the applicability of competition law. See, respectively, Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) Private Healthcare Market Study (December 2011) OFT1396 at p 13, and O Odudu Competition 
Law and the National Health Service(8 October 2012), available at 
https://competitionbulletin.com/2012/10/08/competition-law-and-the-national-health-service/ (last accessed 30 
September 2018).  
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NHS patient * * - - 
Self-pay patient - - * * 
NHS 
commissioner 
* * - - 
PMI  company - - * * 
 
Table 1: Overview of possible candidates for the ‘consumer’ who exercises 
choice and where within the ‘four categories of English healthcare’. 
 
Table 1 shows that NHS patients may be considered consumers of NHS providers such as 
NHS Trusts or NHS Foundation Trusts (category 1), or of private healthcare providers who 
deliver NHS services (category 2). Categories 1 and 2 equate to the ‘NHS patient choice’ 
framework outlined above. NHS commissioners – NHS England for specialist services, and 
CCGs – are similarly consumers for categories 1 and 2. Conversely, PMI companies and 
private patients who use their own means (‘self-pay patients’) are consumers of the private 
healthcare market, whether treated by NHS providers or private healthcare providers in 
categories 3 and 4, respectively. Thus the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework reflects 
movement by a patient from categories 1 and 2 to categories 3 and 4, and the associated 
change in status (from ‘NHS patient’ to ‘private patient’) according to the aforementioned 
DH and NHS England guidance. 
Table 1 also suggests a distinction between NHS patients and private patients on the one 
hand, and NHS Commissioners and PMI companies on the other. This is deliberate since the 
latter are effectively acting as agents for patients to exercise choice – ‘choice’ as exercised 
by private or NHS patients themselves is restricted, respectively, to a relatively small 
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selection of PMI providers operating across the UK122 or to the NHS Commissioner 
available in a given geographical region.  
Although PMI providers can be considered consumers of private healthcare, the focus here 
is on NHS patients, self-pay patients and NHS commissioners as these have all been 
considered to serve a function analogous to consumers in the context of NHS competition 
reforms. Thus, in the context of the New Labour reforms, emphasis was placed on 
protecting both NHS patients and commissioners from anticompetitive behaviour.123 The 
CMA has recognised ‘the NHS’ (explicitly comprising NHS commissioners, but presumably 
extending to NHS patients) as the ‘end customer’ in cases where large pharmaceutical 
companies have been found to engage in anticompetitive behaviour, for example by 
overcharging the NHS for particular drugs.124 By recognising NHS commissioners as end 
customers, it appears possible to interpret this as relating, at least indirectly, to NHS 
patients. Nevertheless, a distinction perhaps emerges in arguments about NHS 
(commissioners) countervailing buyer power to constrain anticompetitive behaviour by 
suppliers in such cases.125 Indeed, the explicit CMA recognition of NHS patients (as distinct 
from NHS commissioners) as consumers appears limited to using the ‘relevant patient 
benefits’ exception126 to approve NHS Foundation Trust mergers against the backdrop of 
the current NHS policy focus on integrated care.  
                                                          
122 Choice of insurer is more developed in other countries, such as the Dutch system of mandatory health 
insurance.  
123 NHS NHS Principles and Rules for Cooperation and Competition (2010) available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/principles-and-rules-for-cooperation-and-competition   (last 
accessed 30 September 2018). These were overseen by the Cooperation and Competition Panel, a Department of 
Health body (https://www.ccpanel.org.uk/ last accessed 30 September 2018). The Cooperation and Competition 
Panel was described by Ben Bradshaw MP as ‘in effect, the NHS’ own Competition Commission’ Hansard HC 
Deb, Column 66WH, 24 February 2009. (The Competition Commission was subsumed into the CMA in 2014).  
124 CMA, Case CE/9742-13. Decision of the Competition and Markets Authority – Unfair pricing in respect of 
the supply of phenytoin sodium capsules in the UK (7 December 2016), p 12. 
125 Ibid, paragraph 4.190, p 242. 




The foregoing discussion demonstrates that choice may be exercised not only by patients, 
but also by other parties acting as agents on behalf of patients, prompting questions of how 
patient choice links first to competition, as distinct from competition law, and then how 
patient choice relates to competition law. 
(b) Is patient choice really connected to competition, as distinct from 
competition law? 
Although patient choice between NHS and private healthcare provider is linked to the 
competition reforms of the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework above, it should properly be 
linked with the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework.127 Indeed, the concept of 
prohibited ‘co-funding’ is key to understanding the controversy surrounding NHS 
competition reforms, since it raises the clear possibility of NHS core principles being 
undermined by different forms of cross-subsidy of private healthcare. Certainly the 
connection of patient choice and competition can depend upon the type of competition at 
issue:128 competition in the market and competition for the market being most relevant here. 
Competition in the market for healthcare provision involves patients playing a direct role in 
choosing a healthcare provider. Within English healthcare, this is most evident within the 
‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework insofar as patients actively choose to ‘exit’ the 
NHS in favour of private provision. The extent to which NHS patients can choose a 
provider in respect of a first outpatient appointment may also be considered a limited form 
of competition in the market in the context of the ‘NHS patient choice’ framework. 
                                                          
127 Patient choice can be linked with wider aspects of healthcare modernisation, such as patient empowerment, 
again with varying degrees of success. See, for example, A Mol The Logic of Care and the Problem of Patient 
Choice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
128 See European Commission, Expert Panel on Effective Ways of Investing in Health (EXPH), Competition 




In contrast, competition for the market of healthcare provision includes procurement 
activity in which providers bid for contracts awarded by NHS commissioners. This 
comprises much of the competition within the NHS.129 The relationship between patient 
choice and competition for the market is contentious and the two may conflict,130 as 
evidenced by the choice available to NHS patients being restricted to the (NHS or private) 
provider chosen by the NHS commissioner. 
From the foregoing it can be inferred that it is possible to have provider competition 
without patient choice, and conversely, patient choice with limited (or no) provider 
competition. Thus, ‘patient choice can be seen either as having intrinsic value or as being 
instrumental to the attainment of policy goals’. 131 Intrinsic value may be illustrated by the 
option to receive different treatment, or the same treatment more quickly within the ‘NHS 
patient – private patient’ framework as this sees (private) provider competition ‘driven by a 
desire to promote choice for patients: choice of hospital or individual physician, choice of 
delivery setting and choice of treatment’.132 Patient choice as instrumental to the attainment 
of policy goals clearly finds reflection in the competition reforms within the ‘NHS patient 
choice’ framework. Thus patient choice is linked with competition (both for or in the market 
as the 2013 Regulations combine both aspects) because ‘competition between providers of 
healthcare only makes sense if there is choice on the demand side’.133 Furthermore, patient 
choice has been considered secondary to the ultimate purpose of competition for NHS-
funded services which is to stimulate greater efficiency and quality in their provision.134 This 
                                                          
129 For further discussion, see Office of Health Economics (OHE), Competition in the NHS (January 2012). 
130 EXPH, above n 128, p 9 and 10. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid, paragraph 37.  
134 OHE, above n 129, page 10. 
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can further be linked to the 2012 Act reforms by the coalition government’s ultimate 
commitment to competition as a means to an end, not an end in itself.135  
However, even if a link between patient choice and competition can be established, it may 
be the case – counterintuitively – that the relationship between patient choice and 
competition law remains opaque. 
(c) How does patient choice relate to competition law? 
The provisions governing anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance form a 
generic framework within both EU and UK competition law.136 In general terms, the 
prohibition on anticompetitive agreements137 is concerned with avoiding (healthcare) 
providers forming cartels and being able to fix prices or share information which would 
prove detrimental to consumers (patients). The prohibition on abuse of dominance138 seeks 
to restrict the individual or collective power of healthcare providers to act independently to 
the detriment of patients or their competitors. Distinctions emerge, however, in the extent 
of applicability of competition law to, respectively, healthcare providers and purchasers at 
EU level139(and thus also national level),140 and to the private healthcare sector and the NHS 
at a national level.141 
                                                          
135 DH, above n 44, page 5. 
136 It is worth noting that EU free movement case law regarding patients accessing treatment in different 
Member States (‘health tourism’) has received some attention in discussions of competition law and healthcare. 
However, this is beyond the scope of the present discussion of patient choice within the English system, other 
than to note that NHS patients may be considered to have a ‘choice’ of receiving treatment abroad under free 
movement case law which finds expression as a ‘right’ within Section 3a of the NHS Constitution (above n 45). 
137 Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Section 2, Competition Act 1998 
(CA98) – also known as the “Chapter I” Prohibition. 
138 Article 102 TFEU. Section 18 CA98 – also known as the “Chapter II” Prohibition. 
139 See JW Van de Gronden and CS Rusu ‘EU competition law and policy and health systems’ in TK Hervey, 
CA Young and LE Bishop (eds), Research Handbook on EU Health Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2017), ch 11. 
140 See the guidance which the CMA adopted from its predecessor – Office of Fair Trading (OFT), ‘Competition 
Law and Public Bodies’, OFT1389. 
141 Odudu, above n 11. See also Guy, above n 86, ch 2. 
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The stated goal of EU competition law – and guiding principle for the CMA142 – is enhancing 
consumer welfare,143 but this concept remains a subject for discussion among competition 
lawyers.144 In general terms, it is possible to equate enhancement of consumer welfare with 
lower prices or higher quality goods. However, its relevance to healthcare provision, and 
the English system in particular, remains unclear, but explains some of the concerns about 
the 2012 Act reforms leading to competition on price and a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding 
quality, which are surely to be distinguished from patient choice.  
An alternative goal of ‘consumer choice’ has been formulated in the United States 
context,145 with healthcare identified as a sector where choice is valued. Whether the ‘NHS 
patient – private patient’ framework can be interpreted as a model of competition in which 
the overall aim is to provide patients with choice is a moot point. Certainly the 
supplementary nature of private healthcare appears to support this, and its continued 
coexistence with the NHS may suggest that patients who are able to move between the two 
value this choice. Further, the CMA has recognised complex interactions between the 
private healthcare market and the NHS, which can be described simply and briefly as 
encompassing both private sector delivery of NHS services to treat NHS patients and NHS 
providers treating private patients (categories 2 and 3 in Table 1 above).  
                                                          
142 See CMA, Prioritisation principles for the CMA (CMA16, April 2014). 
143 ‘Competition policy is a tool at the service of consumers. Consumer welfare is at the heart of our policy and 
its achievement drives our priorities and guides our decisions’. Joaquin Almunia, Competition and Consumers: 
the future of EU competition policy. Speech at European Competition Day, Madrid, 12 May 2010. More 
recently, in a speech by the Director-General for Competition at the European Commission. J Laitenberger, 
‘Enforcing EU competition law: principles, strategy and objectives’. Fordham University, 44th Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy. New York City, 15 September 2017. See further, S 
Albæk, ‘Consumer Welfare in EU competition policy’, in C. Heide-Jørgensen, C.Bergqvist, U. Neergaard and 
S.T. Poulsen (eds.), Aims and Values in Competition Law (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2013).  
144 See, for example, V Daskalova ‘Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About?’ (2015) 
11(1) Competition Law Review 133, R Claassen and A Gerbrandy ‘Rethinking European Competition Law: 
From A Consumer Welfare to a Capability Approach’ (2016) 12(1) Utrecht Law Review 1 and A MacCulloch, 
‘The consumer and competition law’in G Howells, I Ramsay and T Wilhelmsson (eds), Handbook of Research 
on International Consumer Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,2nd edn 2018), ch 4. 
145 N W Averitt and R H Lande ‘Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust Law’, (2007) 74(1) 
Antitrust Law Journal 175. 
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In view of the lack of understanding about what enhancing consumer welfare may mean in 
practical terms in the context of (English) healthcare, it is unsurprising that the relevance of 
patient choice to competition cases concerning healthcare providers should be equally 
unclear. Certainly it has been noted with regard to decisions at EU level that little reference 
is made to the effect of anticompetitive behaviour on patients as ‘end consumers’ of 
healthcare.146 
Overall, it appears that despite the bracketing together of ‘choice and competition’ under 
New Labour policies to legitimise the expansion of private sector delivery of NHS services, 
the two concepts may become increasingly separate following the 2012 Act reforms. 
4. PATIENT CHOICE IN ENGLISH HEALTHCARE AND COMPETITION REFORMS 
Recent competition reforms affect patient choice in English healthcare in two ways. Firstly, 
in response to controversy surrounding the 2012 Act reforms, a version of New Labour 
patient choice policies was enshrined by the 2013 Regulations. This has been described as a 
‘juridification’ of public policy,147 and entails differing implications for patients to exercise 
choice. Secondly, a lesser-noted reform is found in the CMA’s current development of the 
private healthcare market, and the operation of NHS providers within this. Taken together, 
these reforms prompt questions about the role of patients within, respectively, the ‘NHS 
patient choice’ framework and the ‘NHS patient – private patient’ framework following the 
2012 Act reforms and the CMA’s 2014 private healthcare market investigation. 
(a) The 2012 Act reforms: a confused narrative about the role of patients in 
competition in English healthcare? 
                                                          
146 W Sauter ‘The Impact of EU Competition Law on National Healthcare Systems’ (2013) 38(4) E L Rev, 457.  
147 Davies, above n 43. 
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The competition provisions of the 2012 Act set out a framework comprising oversight and 
enforcement powers in respect of anticompetitive behaviour under general competition 
law,148 market investigations,149 mergers involving NHS Foundation Trusts,150 and the ‘NHS-
specific’ regime of the aforementioned 2013 Regulations.151 Of these, only the 2013 
Regulations make specific provision for patient choice. Thus far, only one case (involving 
CCGs in the North-West of England) has considered the patient choice regulations. 
This case involved Spire, a private provider, alleging that the Blackpool CCG and Fylde and 
Wyre CCG had actively referred NHS patients away from its hospital, based on patient 
referral trends in previous years. Whilst the complaint incorporated all three patient choice 
standing rules (SRs) under the 2012 Regulations,152 NHS Improvement established that there 
had only been a breach in respect of SRs 39 and 42 – choice of provider for first outpatient 
appointment, and publicity and promotion of the availability of choice, respectively. In 
respect of SR 39, NHS Improvement accepted undertakings for the CCGs concerned to 
ensure that GPs report the number of patients offered choice at their practice, and to take 
steps if areas for improvement are identified by annual patient surveys.153 In respect of SR 
42, NHS Improvement accepted undertakings by the CCGs to promote patient choice on 
the websites of the CCG and GP, and in GP premises, as well as producing promotional 
materials and conducting other promotional activities. 
However, it is notable that Spire acknowledged that it could not be certain that patients 
would have chosen its hospital,154 as this raises interesting considerations about the 
                                                          
148 2012 Act, section 72. 
149 2012 Act, section 73. 
150 2012 Act, section 79. 
151 Established under section 75 of the 2012 Act. 
152 Above n 90.  
153 See NHS Improvement’s Decisions to accept undertakings by NHS Fylde and Wyre and NHS Blackpool 
CCGs. Monitor above n 101. 
154 Monitor above n 101, paragraph 4.6. 
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incorporation of private providers in delivering NHS services and patient switching 
behaviour.  Offering NHS patients the opportunity to use private facilities may not be 
sufficient if patient choice of hospital is based primarily on convenience and an NHS 
provider requires less travel time. Polarised views about private healthcare and the NHS 
may also prove sufficient for some patients to favour a particular provider.  
It might be considered that this case simply illustrates the highly formalistic approach of the 
2012 Regulations and the 2013 Regulations as regards patient choice. However, it also gives 
insight into who would make use of the provisions, with the limited probability that it may 
be individual patients who pursue their entitlement to adequate information for making 
meaningful choices. Interestingly, such considerations also come into play with the CMA’s 
current development of the private healthcare market. 
(b) The CMA’s 2014 private healthcare market investigation – providing 
information as a first step to promoting patient choice? 
The CMA defines the private healthcare market in terms of NHS providers treating private 
patients via PPUs and private providers treating private patients (categories 3 and 4 in Table 
1 above). NHS activity undertaken by private providers (category 2 in Table 1 above) is not 
included, although the CMA recognises that this forms part of the business model of some 
private providers.155 
The CMA’s 2014 market investigation identified various aspects where there is an adverse 
effect on competition which hinders the market from working effectively. For the purposes 
of the present discussion, these related to the limited availability of information available to 
private patients which was considered to inhibit their ability to make choices between NHS 
and private providers. The CMA’s remedy was to appoint the Private Healthcare 




Information Network (PHIN) as an ‘Information Organisation’ and to impose requirements 
on NHS and private providers to supply information. The intention is for data to be collated 
and made available on PHIN’s website for private patients to access. Information to be 
provided comprises a range of performance measures disaggregated by procedure at both 
hospital and consultant level.156 These relate, inter alia, to infection rates, mortality rates, 
unplanned patient transfers (from a private healthcare facility to an NHS facility), and 
procedure-specific measures of improvement in health outcomes. 
At the time of writing (September 2018), the CMA has taken action against seven NHS 
Trusts and NHS Foundation Trusts157 by issuing directions requiring these, inter alia, to 
share relevant data with PHIN, pay subscriptions to PHIN and start systematic collection of 
patient reported outcome measures (PROMs) specified by PHIN.158  This intervention by 
the CMA intervention on behalf of patients as consumers of healthcare may be welcome as 
a step to facilitating patient choice in general terms, but may ultimately only benefit a 
minority of private patients, rather than the majority of the patient body (NHS patients). 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article started from the premise that the concept of patient choice can offer mutual 
insights into movement between the NHS and private healthcare and recent competition 
reforms which have thus far been underexplored. By juxtaposing the ‘NHS patient-private 
patient’ and ‘NHS patient choice’ frameworks it has been possible to facilitate understanding 
and progress discussions of the complex and controversial subject of private healthcare and 
NHS interaction. This has led to three main insights. 
                                                          
156 CMA Private Healthcare Market Investigation Order (As Amended) (28 February 2017), part 4 Information. 
Paragraph 21.1. 
157 CMA above n 33. 
158 See, for example, CMA, Directions to Royal Devon and Exeter NHS Foundation Trust issued under the 
Private Healthcare Market Investigation Order (31 August 2017). 
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Firstly, the NHS patient-private patient framework as a basis for competition reforms (and 
the NHS patient choice framework) is problematic. Patients making choices between 
competing NHS and private alternatives does not provide a complete picture of varying 
availability across England. The NHS-private healthcare relationship is inescapably symbiotic 
and the development of future policy for providing services to patients needs to recognise 
this and acknowledge the collaborative elements: private providers need NHS work, and the 
NHS relies on private providers. Furthermore, implying that the ‘NHS patient -private 
patient’ framework represents a ‘model of competition’ must be accepted as reductive and 
simplistic and future policy may need to acknowledge this. 
Secondly, the question has been raised as to whether the DH guidance shaped under New 
Labour offers a suitable basis for shaping current NHS England and CCG guidance regarding 
patient movement between the NHS and private healthcare sector. The intervening events 
of the 2012 Act reforms and 2014 CMA market investigation may suggest that the existing 
policy is less relevant in view of the refocusing each has entailed. It would be surprising if 
guidance, which is now a decade old (or more), remains fit for purpose.  Indeed, perhaps 
the NHS’ 70th anniversary offers a good opportunity to revisit the idea of GPs as 
gatekeepers giving advice to patients concerning the available options. The BMA has 
suggested that maintaining a strict separation between NHS and private healthcare may 
appear unduly bureaucratic. Furthermore, the argument that it may be difficult to distinguish 
between acting in a patient’s best interests from a purely clinical perspective and avoiding 
any suggestion of benefits accruing to a GP or private provider may seem less persuasive if 
the alternative is to leave patients to muddle through without relevant, comprehensible 
information on which to base meaningful choices. 
Finally, raising awareness of the distinction between competition (law) and patient choice is 
significant – and especially so when it can be suggested that the knitting together of the two 
36 
 
may increasingly unravel following the 2012 Act reforms and the CMA’s 2014 market 
investigation. This is not to deny that competition may help in driving up standards. Rather, 
the question is whether it is at the level of individual patient choice that improved standards 
can be set in motion. The Blackpool and Fylde and Wyre CCGs case suggests that private 
providers, not individual patients, may seek to ensure that adequate information is publicised 
regarding choice in the NHS patient choice framework, and the absence of further cases 
under the 2013 Regulations raises questions about how this can develop. The CMA’s 
remedy of appointing PHIN and enforcing collection of data regarding private healthcare 
providers may similarly be considered limited – if ever intended to provide a comprehensive 
solution to facilitating patient choice in the NHS patient-private patient framework. 
 
